

# A new exploit for zero-day vulnerability CVE-2018-8589

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Research

Research

14 Nov 2018

minute read



## Authors

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Yesterday, Microsoft published its security bulletin, which patches a vulnerability discovered by our technologies. We reported it to Microsoft on October 17, 2018. The company confirmed the vulnerability and assigned it CVE-2018-8589.

## Acknowledgements

Igor Soumenkov (2igosha) of Kaspersky Lab  
Boris Larin (Oct0xor) of Kaspersky Lab

In October 2018, our Automatic Exploit Prevention (AEP) systems detected an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows operating system. Further analysis revealed a zero-day vulnerability in win32k.sys. The exploit was executed by the first stage of a malware installer in order to gain the necessary privileges for persistence on the victim's system. So far, we have detected a very limited number of attacks using this vulnerability. The victims are located in the Middle East.

Kaspersky Lab products detected this exploit proactively using the following technologies:

- Behavioral Detection Engine and Automatic Exploit Prevention for endpoints
- Advanced Sandboxing and Anti-Malware Engine for Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack Platform (KATA)

Kaspersky Lab verdicts for the artifacts in this campaign are:

- HEUR:Exploit.Win32.Generic
- HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
- PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic


More information about the attack is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reports. Contact: [intelreports@kaspersky.com](mailto:intelreports@kaspersky.com)

## Technical details

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CVE-2018-8589 is a race condition present in win32k!xxxMoveWindow due to improper locking of messages sent synchronously between threads.

The exploit uses the vulnerability by creating two threads with a class and associated window and moves the window of the opposite thread inside the callback of a WM\_NCCALCSIZE message in a window procedure that is common to both threads.



*WM\_NCCALCSIZE message in win32k!xxxCalcValidRects*

Termination of the opposite thread on the maximum level of recursion inside the WM\_NCCALCSIZE callback will cause asynchronous copyin of the IParam structure controlled by the attacker.

```

9e303888 918f64ce win32k!SfnINOUTNCCALCSIZE+0x263 <- (2) corrupt stack
9e30390c 9193c677 win32k!xxxReceiveMessage+0x480
9e303960 9193c5cb win32k!xxxRealSleepThread+0x90
9e30397c 918ecbac win32k!xxxSleepThread+0x2d
9e3039f0 9192c3af win32k!xxxInterSendMsgEx+0xb1c
9e303a40 9192c4f2 win32k!xxxSendMessageTimeout+0x13b
9e303a68 918fbec1 win32k!xxxSendMessage+0x28
9e303b2c 91910c1a win32k!xxxCalcValidRects+0x462 <- (1) send WM_NCCALCSIZE
9e303b90 91911056 win32k!xxxEndDeferWindowPosEx+0x126
9e303bb0 918b1f89 win32k!xxxSetWindowPos+0xf6
9e303bdc 918b1ee1 win32k!xxxMoveWindow+0x8a

```

*Lack of proper message locking between win32k!xxxCalcValidRects and win32k!SfnINOUTNCCALCSIZE*

The exploit populates IParam with pointers to the shellcode and after being successfully copied to kernel inside win32k!SfnINOUTNCCALCSIZE, the kernel jumps to the user level. The exploit found in the wild only targeted 32-bit versions of Windows 7.

```
A problem has been detected and windows has been shut down to prevent damage to your computer.
```

```
PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA
```

```
If this is the first time you've seen this Stop error screen, restart your computer. If this screen appears again, follow these steps:
```

```
check to make sure any new hardware or software is properly installed. If this is a new installation, ask your hardware or software manufacturer for any windows updates you might need.
```

```
If problems continue, disable or remove any newly installed hardware or software. Disable BIOS memory options such as caching or shadowing. If you need to use Safe Mode to remove or disable components, restart your computer, press F8 to select Advanced Startup Options, and then select Safe Mode.
```

```
Technical information:
```

```
*** STOP: 0x00000050 (0xc0c0c0c0, 0x00000008, 0xc0c0c0c0, 0x00000000)
```

```
collecting data for crash dump ...  
initializing disk for crash dump ...  
beginning dump of physical memory.  
dumping physical memory to disk: 15
```

*BSOD on an up-to-date version of Windows 7 with our proof of concept*

As always, we provided Microsoft with a proof of concept for this vulnerability along with well-written source code.

- [Microsoft Windows](#)
- [Proof-of-Concept](#)
- [Vulnerabilities and exploits](#)
- [Zero-day vulnerabilities](#)

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From the same authors



**MysterySnail attacks with Windows zero-day**

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**Zero-day vulnerability in Desktop Window Manager (CVE-2021-28310) used in the wild**

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


**Operation PowerFall: CVE-2020-0986 and variants**

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## Internet Explorer and Windows zero-day exploits used in Operation PowerFall




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Reports

### **APT trends report Q1 2022**

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This is our latest summary of advanced persistent threat (APT) activity, focusing on events that we observed during Q1 2022.

### **Lazarus Trojanized DeFi app for delivering malware**

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We recently discovered a Trojanized DeFi application that was compiled in November 2021. This application contains a legitimate program called DeFi Wallet that saves and manages a cryptocurrency wallet, but also implants a full-featured backdoor.

### **MoonBounce: the dark side of UEFI firmware**


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At the end of 2021, we inspected UEFI firmware that was tampered with to embed a malicious code we dub MoonBounce. In this report we describe how the MoonBounce implant works and how it is connected to APT41.

## **The BlueNoroff cryptocurrency hunt is still on**

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It appears that BlueNoroff shifted focus from hitting banks and SWIFT-connected servers to solely cryptocurrency businesses as the main source of the group's illegal income.



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