


BlackNet RAT - When you leave the Panel unprotected

 pwncode.io/2019/12/blacknet-rat-when-you-leave-panel.html



BlackNET is a PHP based Web Panel which has a builder written in VB.NET. It is being actively used in-the-wild for malicious activities.


Recently, while analysing a malicious .NET Binary, I came across something interesting which caught my attention. Before I share those details, I will discuss a little bit about the capabilities of the payload, the project itself and then will present the discovery :)

MD5 hash of the sample discussed: 7e88ccc91e0f9a242c4723e43afa93ab

The .NET binaries used in-the-wild which leverage BlackNET panel are not obfuscated. At least the binaries I analysed so far are not protected or obfuscated. This makes the process of analysis straightforward.

How to identify whether this is related to BlackNET?

When you decompile the binary, the list of .NET methods are sufficient to correlate and understand that they have used the BlackNET [project](#). In our case, after decompiling the .NET binary, we can see the list of methods as shown below:



The names of the methods are self explanatory however for the purpose of brevity, I will mention below some of the capabilities:

AntiVM: It has the ability to detect a Virtual Machine by checking for the presence of the DLL files, **vmGuestLib.dll** and **vboxmrxnp.dll** on the file system. If it finds these files, then it will delete them.

It also tries to load the DLL, **SbieDll.dll** to check for the presence of Sandboxie (a very common method).

DDoS: Various methods of DDoS are supported by this binary which include: ARME, Slowloris, UDP, TCP, HTTP GET and HTTP POST request based. The attacker can specify the host address they want to perform the DDoS attack against using the BlackNET Panel. They can also select the DDoS method as can be seen [here](#)

LimeLogger: This is the key logging module which leverages LowLevelKeyboardProc() function along with SetWindowsHookEx() to do keylogging.

Screening_Programs: This method checks for the presence of analysis tools used by Malware Researchers. It performs checks using both the process names as well as the Window Titles as shown below:

```

string[] array = new string[]
{
    "Armitage",
    "SDBotKIT",
    "AppInspector",
    "Snooper",
    "WinSniff",
    "WMI",
    "sploit404",
    "IPTracker",
    "iparts",
    "ProcessTracker",
    "Keylogger",
    "File-Printer",
    "Tracer",
    "vbs",
    "ScanIP",
    "HostIP",
    "regedit",
    "ReguP32Ex",
    "NetSiftTools",
    "Fakelogs",
    "NetFactor",
    "vbsa",
    "Netcat-RTSP",
    "AdvancedProcessController",
    "ProcessAssault",
    "ProcessGuard",
    "SystemExplorer"
}
}
string[] array2 = new string[]
{
    "Agent001",
    "Malwarebytes Anti-Malware",
    "Malwarebytes Anti-Malware",
    "FCMP",
    "SmartDef",
    "Action_Maps",
    "ProcessSpy",
    "HWID_Software",
    "CurrPorts",
    "System Explorer",
    "Gigamon's Port Explorer",
    "WinSxS",
    "Metasploit",
    "Sploit Tool",
    "The WinNetworks Network Analyzer",
    "Sandbox Control",
    "Agent001",
    ".NET Reflector"
}
}

```

I have included the list in Appendix which can be used as a reference by you to harden your Virtual Machine while analyzing malwares in future.

Unprotected Web Panels

These web panels are easy to deploy. Just get a web hosting, upload the PHP scripts, run the Installation script which sets up the database and the Panel is ready to use.

I noticed that most users of BlackNET Web Panel are leveraging the hosting provided by 000webhostapp.com

One such example is the binary we are discussing in this article.

Once the sample is executed on the machine, it will gather basic details from the machine, send them in an HTTP GET request to the BlackNET panel and register the machine. For each victim's machine, an ID is generated in the format: Hacked_<ID>

Below is an example of the HTTP GET requests initiated by the binary:

#	Email	Method	Host	URI	Content	Body	Caching	Content Type	Process
41	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
42	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
43	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
44	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
45	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
46	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
47	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
48	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
49	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
50	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
51	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
52	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
53	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
54	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
55	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
56	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
57	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
58	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
59	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
60	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe
61	000	HTTP	000webhostapp.com	/	GET	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	0	text/html	cmd.exe

tkshot was used to capture the screenshot from the machine.

The command itself is defined in the code [here](#)

This could be the result of the admin verifying whether the panel is working properly by taking a screenshot of their machine. However, they forgot to delete the screenshot from the panel to clear any traces.

Below are some more MD5 hashes of .NET binaries using the BlackNET Panel:

```
d25ee82934bec167345502a1e7e3c931
3d28dc46e048daee4974dc5e2fe08bfd
1fd19fcca59ed976ee57640dafba5518
601b4e3b04069beed78e8ce1d2859d4a
c736fcdba9c96eb9b7d8f65e6ab8a4c9
52cd657b18efdbd92f7347d439016c6b
6e36e783324800952f4c0ebea2262fb9
e829cf7a744547e5f1aca6f53061a7b7
2033caac6e8064bd845004d4d628ebe3
8ea79fb698558a8fbed892a8297f3f4b
8d72b32f0d9796443218f1363324f731
281a4bbd61d5e5e310c407b10dafb78c
cd1084d9755db2a38402df2171f25948
83614ce163a71a04fb450f5cd55bfb9f
4a9102b122d9a8dcfe693693f4d91910
8c7e485a40ba5f1881801e56ca298eb0
6fa52977cb3aef5606900cd7a11df4da
6947014e2a2b60445860bfaf5ba35dc6
bdfa464369c660fabff9ec700c49bab9
9b4402ac464744fd4ed118c956752bbc
dc4cf73a81f74f4aa3ec5224ba2cee91
31dc0a5c441b531e029a4158354a1529
6d34058315b46deb297c3d7f712f7451
53c1d9cbf7ca1147880de072d64980dd
d45bac3b009058b11cab7a9b4048c8d
```

More Web Panels:

```
hxxp://davidescu.000webhostapp.com/BlackNET Panel/
hxxps://imdavidfree.000webhostapp.com//BlackNET%20Panel
hxxps://impieselfree.000webhostapp.com/blacknet
hxxp://homedeco.id/
hxxps://davidbotnet.000webhostapp.com/blacknet
hxxp://piratashost.top:82/panel/
```

Appendix:

List of Process Names Checked:

procexp
SbieCtrl
SpyTheSpy
SpeedGear
wireshark
mbam
apateDNS
IPBlocker
cports
ProcessHacker
KeyScrambler
TiGeR-Firewall
Tcpview
xn5x
smsniff
exeinfoPE
regshot
RogueKiller
NetSnifferCs
taskmgr
Reflector
capsa
NetworkMiner
AdvancedProcessController
ProcessLassoLauncher
ProcessLasso
SystemExplorer

List of Window Titles Checked:

ApateDNS
Malwarebytes Anti-Malware
TCPEye
SmartSniff
Active Ports
ProcessEye
MKN TaskExplorer
CurrPorts
System Explorer
DiamondCS Port Explorer

VirusTotal
Metascan Online
Speed Gear
The Wireshark Network Analyzer
Sandboxie Control
.NET Reflector

c0d3inj3cT